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Abstract
We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Mi-
nority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each
agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An
evolutionary rule for strategy modification is included to mimic simple learn-
ing. The results can be understood by considering crowd formation within
the population.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is rapidly growing interest in the study of complex adaptive systems (CAS) [1].
They not only provide a challenging problem for physicists because of the non-trivial self-
organizing phenomena which can emerge, but also have potential applications in a variety
of economical, biological and financial problems [2–4]. An important step forward in agent-
based models of CAS was made by Challet and Zhang [5,6] who proposed the so-called
Minority Game (MG) in which an odd number of agents successively compete to be in the
minority. The agents make decisions by evaluating the performance of their strategies from
past experience and hence they can adapt. The strategies are randomly assigned to the
agents in the beginning of the game and are used throughout the game, hence introducing
some quenched disorder. The agents have access to global information, which is in turn
generated by the actions of the agents themselves. As the game progresses, non-trivial
fluctuations arise in the agents’ collective decisions - these can be understood in terms
of the dynamical formation of crowds consisting of agents using correlated strategies, and
anticrowds consisting of agents using the anticorrelated strategies [7]. Challet and coworkers
have recently presented a remarkable connection between the MG and spin glass systems
[8].
The MG, however, does not incorporate evolution. Agents may get stuck with poorly
performing strategies as a result of the initial (random) strategy distribution. Johnson
et al [9–12] proposed a version of MG which involves an evolving population. In this so-
called evolutionary minority game (EMG), all the agents hold one and the same strategy
which is simply to follow the most recent trend. Hence the strategy is dynamical. Each
agent also carries a probability p characterizing the chance of following the prediction of the
strategy. Evolution comes in by allowing agents to modify their p values when their success
rate becomes too low, hence mimicking the notion that market participants ought to learn
from past mistakes. Surprisingly, agents who either always follow or never follow the trend
generally perform better than cautious agents [9].
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In an effort to explain the non-trivial behaviour observed in MG and EMG, D’hulst and
Rodgers [13] pointed out the relevance of the Hamming distance between strategies and
studied a modified version of EMG in which each agent holds a randomly selected strategy
and a probability p. The theory gives results which appear to resemble those of EMG.
In contrast to EMG, however, each agent now has a fixed (i.e. non-dynamical) strategy
throughout the game. Moreover, it has recently been pointed out that this modified model
and the basic EMG actually give qualitatively different numerical results [11]. Recently, we
presented a theory for the basic EMG which gives good agreement with numerical data [12].
Our theory properly includes the self-interaction of the agents [12].
The modified EMG model of D’hulst and Rodgers [13] is, however, an interesting model
in its own right. In particular, it brings together the idea of evolution from the basic EMG
and the idea of random initial strategy distribution from the MG. Here we present detailed
numerical results for this modified EMG model of D’hulst and Rodgers [13]. The results are
contrasted with those for the basic EMG and MG where possible. The paper is organized
as follows. The modified EMG model is defined in Sec.II. Section III gives the numerical
results. Differences and similarities are pointed out between the modified model and the
basic EMG and MG. Our results are summarized in Sec.IV.
II. MODEL
The model consists of an odd number N of agents. Each agent has to choose between
two decisions, 0 or 1, at each timestep. The winning side, i.e., the minority side, represents
the outcome of the game at that timestep. These outcomes form the global information
made known to all agents. As in the MG, the agents make their decision based on the
most recent m outcomes. There are a total of 2m different possible histories. A strategy
is defined as a mapping from the history space to the action space. Since for each possible
history there are two possible decisions, there exist a total of 22
m
different strategies. Each
agent is allowed to pick one strategy from the pool of strategies in the beginning of the
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game. Some agents may share a common strategy. The strategy remains fixed throughout
the game. This random assignment of strategies is identical to that in MG [5], but different
from the EMG [9]. As in the EMG, however, evolutionary behaviour is allowed through
the assignment of a parameter p to each agent characterizing the probability that the agent
follows the prediction of his strategy. The agent thus has a probability 1 − p to make the
decision opposite to what his strategy predicts. Each agent is randomly assigned a p-value
in the beginning of the game. The scores of all agents are set to zero initially. An agent
wins and gains one point if he belongs to the minority group. Otherwise, he loses with one
point deducted. If the score drops to d (d < 0), an agent is allowed to modify his p value by
choosing a value within a range R centered at the original p value and his score is reset to
zero. Reflective boundary conditions ensure that p always lies within the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Results are found to be insensitive to the particular choice of boundary conditions.
III. RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the p-values P (p) among the agents, obtained numer-
ically after the transient stage of the game has died away. The distribution is normalized
such that
∫
1
0
P (p)dp = N . The parameters chosen are N = 101, d = −4 and R = 0.2.
The features observed are insensitive to the initial p-distribution. It is observed that P (p)
depends sensitively on m, in contrast to the m-independence of P (p) observed in the basic
EMG [9,11,14]. For small m, P (p) has peaks near p ∼ 1 and p ∼ 0 implying agents who
always act according to or opposite to the trend perform better than those with intermediate
values of p. This feature is qualitatively similar to that in the basic EMG with the m = 1
results closely resembling those reported in Ref. [9]. For small m such that 2 · 2m ≪ N , the
strategies are almost uniformly distributed among the agents and all strategies are played.
This distribution of strategies, together with the fact that every agent holds only one strat-
egy, therefore ensures that every strategy and its anticorrelated partner will be used in each
turn of the game. The form of P (p) for small m, namely symmetrical about p = 0.5 with
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peaks at the extreme values on either side, leads to good cancellation between the actions
taken by the agents using anti-correlated pairs of strategies [7]. This self-organization in
the population, in turn, has the advantage that it increases the number of winning agents
per turn. Although this optimization of a ‘global profit’ is not the aim of each individual
agent when the decision is made, it results from the competition among the agents. As m
increases, P (p) gradually flattens off. In the limit of large m, i.e. 2 · 2m ≫ N , only a small
portion of the whole pool of strategies is picked by the agents. It is therefore unlikely that
strategies which are anti-correlated to each other are being played. With or without the
effect of the p-values, the game is in the random coin-toss limit. There is no advantage to
having one particular p-value over another, hence the flat form of P (p) at high m. The inset
in Fig. 1 gives the m-dependence of the mean lifespan L(p), which is the average number
of turns a certain value p survives between modifications. The features are similar to those
in P (p).
The above discussion implies that for small m, the standard deviation (SD) in the num-
ber of agents making a certain decision (either 0 or 1) is small due to the cancellation in
the actions taken by agents using anti-correlated pairs of strategies. For large m, the SD
approaches the random coin-toss limit of
√
N/2. Figure 2 shows the SD as a function of m
for N = 101. It can be seen that the SD does indeed increase monotonically with m, up to
the random coin-toss limit. Also included in Fig. 2 are the results, averaged over different
initial distributions of strategies, for the minority game (MG) with s = 2. These s = 2 MG
results are included in order to contrast the different ways in which adaptive behaviour is
introduced in the two models. In the s = 2 MG, each agent randomly picks two strategies
initially, with repetitions allowed. The picked strategies may not always give the opposite
action in response to a given history of the most recent m outcomes. In the modified EMG,
each agent effectively holds one randomly picked strategy together with its anti-correlated
counterpart, and chooses between them stochastically using p. The modified EMG is hence
effective in forming similar-sized crowds and anticrowds, thereby yielding a smaller-than-
random SD for a wide range of m values (see Fig. 2). The s = 2 MG, however, has a much
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higher SD for small m as it does not have the built-in crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect.
Also shown in Fig. 2 is the SD for the basic EMG: the SD is m-independent and takes on a
value close to the m = 1 result of the modified EMG. In the basic EMG, every agent carries
the same strategy at a given moment and the self-organized distribution P (p) leads to an
effective crowd-anticrowd cancellation which is independent of the size of the strategy space,
and hence m.
Figure 3 shows the dependence of P (p) and L(p) (inset) on d. The properly normalized
P (p) as shown does not depend on d while L(p) depends on |d| in such a way that L(p) ∼ |d|.
Both features are identical to those in the basic EMG. If we denote τ(p) as the average
winning probability of an agent playing with value p, L(p) = |d|/(1 − 2τ(p)). It should be
noted that for all versions of the MG, τ < 1/2. However, the results of L(p) reported here
give values of τ(p) which are quite different from those obtained by numerically solving the
set of equations given in Ref. [13]. Figure 4 shows P (p) and L(p) for various values of R.
Both P (p) and L(p) show some dependence on R with the peaks on both sides becoming
less pronounced as R increases. Comparing with the results of EMG [11], the modified
EMG has a more sensitive dependence on R although the results are qualitatively similar.
A full explanation of the enhanced sensitivity to R requires us to consider the details of
the dynamics of the game, since R controls the effective diffusion in p-space. This will be
addressed in future work.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have presented numerical results for a modified EMG. The distribution P (p) is found
to bem-dependent, in contrast to the basic EMG. Form = 1, the modified EMG gives results
similar to the basic EMG. As m increases, the strategy distribution leads to a larger SD
than the basic EMG since the crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect gets reduced. For large
m, the strategy pool is so large that the game is effectively in the random coin-toss limit. In
terms of the behavior of the SD, the present modified EMG interpolates between the basic
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EMG at small m, and the MG at large m. We also found that the R dependences of P (p)
and L(p) are enhanced by the implementation of the random strategy distribution.
In both the basic EMG and the modified EMG, the adaptability associated with the
stochastic p parameter reduces the SD to values below the random coin-toss limit for all
values of m. This was reported earlier [9] for the basic EMG: interestingly, another example
of reduction of SD to values below the random coin-toss limit was subsequently reported
for the so-called Thermal Minority Game (TMG) [15–17]. In the TMG, each agent may use
one of his s strategies in each turn according to a probability determined by a parameter
T playing the role of ‘temperature’ [15,17]. It was found that for s = 2, for example,
the SD for the TMG at small m drops to values below the coin-toss limit. The reason
can be understood quantitatively in terms of crowd-anticrowd formation [18]. In essence,
the built-in frustration in the basic MG due to the distribution of strategies among agents
gives rise to a large SD at small m because of the large size of the crowds as compared to
the anticrowds [7]. The introduction of temperature effects helps to build up the crowd-
anticrowd cancellation by allowing similar-sized crowds and anticrowds to form [18], hence
reducing the SD. The present modified EMG is similar to the TMG in that each agent can
be regarded as holding effectively two strategies, together with a stochastic rule for strategy-
use at each timestep: one strategy is randomly picked and played with probability p while
the anti-correlated strategy is played with probability 1 − p. Thus, p plays a somewhat
similar role to the temperature T in TMG. (Compare Fig. 2 of the present paper with the
inset of Fig. 3 in Ref. [16]). However, we emphasize that the (s = 2) strategies effectively
held by agents in the modified EMG always form an anti-correlated pair - this is not the
case in TMG. Finally, we note that a variant of the MG was proposed by Challet et al in
which agents also have s = 2 anti-correlated strategies [19]: however the agents did not use
a stochastic variable to choose between their strategies at each timestep, hence the results
are not directly related to those of the present modified EMG model.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. The frequency distribution P (p) and average lifespan L(p) (inset) of the modified EMG
for N = 101, d = −4, R = 0.2 and different values of m (m = 1, 4, 7, 10). In contrast to basic
EMG, both P (p) and L(p) depend on m.
FIG. 2. The standard deviation (SD) in the number of agents making a certain decision as a
function of m for the modified EMG, the basic EMG, and the MG with s = 2. N = 101, d = −4
and R = 0.2.
FIG. 3. The frequency distribution P (p) and average lifespan L(p) (inset) forN = 101, R = 0.2,
m = 3 and different values of d (d = −1, −4, −7, −10).
FIG. 4. The frequency distribution P (p) and average lifespan L(p) (inset) for N = 101, m = 3,
d = −4, and different values of R (R = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0).
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